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FINNEGAN ". FINNEGAN

[L. A. 22394. In Bank.

[42C.2d

May. 4, 1954.]

LOUISE M. S. FINNEGAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v.
WILLIAM J. FINNEGAN. Defendant and Appellant.
[1] Husband and Wife-Transactions Inter Se.-A husband and
wife may contract with respect to their property (Civ. Code,
§ 158), and if they are living separate and apart they may
provide for support and maintenance of either of them and
their children. (Civ. Code, § 159.)
[2] Divorce - Permanent Alimony - Modi1l.cation of AllowanceEffect of Agreement of Parties.-As between husband and wife,
if provisions in an agreement by them for support and maintenance have been made an integral or inseverable part of
divisiOD
their property, and court in a divorce or separate
maintenance action has approved agreement, its provisions cannot thereafter be modified without consent of both parties.
[3] Id. - Separate Maintenance - Modi1l.cation of Allowance.Where husband and wife while living separate and apart
entered into a valid contract settling both their property and
support rights and secured its approval and adoption by
court as basis for a final judgment of separate maintenance,
and where wife has accepted benefits of agreement, husband
has at all times performed his obligations thereunder, and
neither party has given the other grounds for abrogating
agreement, the agreement is binding on them and court, and
court cannot modify payments or a.ward costs and attorney
fees contrary to its terms.

0'

APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Loa
Angeles County denying increased allowance for wife support and directing husband to pay attorneys' fees and costs
of appeal. Elmer D. Doyle and Mildred L. Lillie. Judges.
Order denying increased allowance, affirm~d; other order reversed.
J eny Giesler and Harold C. Holland for Plainti1f and
Appellant.
A. A. Goldstone for Defendant and Appellant.
[1] See Cal.Jur., Husband and Wife, § 44 et seq.; Am.Jur., Husband and Wife, § 252 et seq.
[2J See Am.Jur .• Divorce and Separation, § 643 et seq.
Melt. Dig. References: fl] Rn!;band and Wife, § 154; [2]
Divorce, § 216(1); [3] Divol'ce, § 111.
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TRAYNOR, J.-LI 1943 plaintiff secured 8 decree of separate maintenance 8'\t ttrding her all of the community property and $100 per month for the support of the minor son
of the parties. On defendant's appeal the decree was affirmed as to these provisions but reversed insofar as it ordered
a sale of certain property by 8 receiver. (Finnegan v. Finnegan, 64 Cal.App.2d 109 [148 P.2d 37].) Thereafter the parties entered into a property settlement agreement, which by
stipulation was adopted as the basis for a final judgment
of separate maintenance. The stipulation provided that "the
provisions of the property settlement agreement between the
parties dated April 14, 1944, are intended to be and are in
. full and complete settlement of the property rights and obligations which are or could be litigated in the above entitled
action.
[T 1he parties have read and are familiar with
the judgment attached hereto, are desirous that it be executed and consent that it may be signed by any judge of the
Superior Court for Los Angeles County.. . [S] aid judgment when signed and filed shall be in complete satisfaction
of the mutual rights and obligations of the parties hereto
respecting all matters litigated in this action whether or not
covered by or included in the judgment heretofore and on
May 20. 1943 filed and entered herein." The judgment provided that plaintiff was entitled to live separate and apart
from defendant. approved the property settlement agreement,
and provided that in conformity with its terms "defendant
be and he is hereby ordered to pay to said plaintiff the sums
for alimony and support of herself and minor son as provided
in Paragraph Five of said Agreement. said payments to be
at the rate of Two Hundred Seventy Dollars ($270.00) per
month commencing August 5th, 1944. until said monthly sums
are reduced as provided in said Agreement.
" The agreement. which was attached to the judgment and incorporated
therein in its entirety by reference. recited that the parties
were living separate and apart and that'they bad agreed
"upon a mutual property settlement pertaining to all the
property of every kind. nature and description. belonging to
them. or either of them, and to be a complete and final settlement of their mutual rights and claim!'l of every kind and
nature whatsoever.
"The agreement then listed the property in which one or both of the parties asserted an interest
and made detailed provisions for its division. Paragraph five
provided for the payment of $270 pel' month for alimony
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and support for plaintiff and the minor son of the parties.
These payments were to be reduced to $170 per month when
the son either died, married, became of age, or became selfsupporting, and were to terminate on the death or remarriage
of plaintiff. It was also provided that if defendant sold certain
patents, plaintiff should receive half of the amount realized,
and if she received $25,000 from this source, the $170 per
month alimony should terminate. If she received less than
$25,000, the payments should be reduced pro tanto. Paragraph 13 provided that "The property received by each of
the parties hereto. respectively, and the agreements herein
contained are received and made by each of the parties hereto
in full of all claims and rights of every kind, nature and
description, which either party hereto may have or claim to
have against the other now or hereafter, including any rights
or relief with respect to property or maintenance which [plaintiff] might obtain in said action D-224. 875. and in full for
all claims and rights which either party hereto would have
upon the estate of the other, and is in lieu of all rights which
the law would give the other as husband or wife. or as a surviving husband or wife. . . . " The agreement also contained
a waiver by plaintiff of court costs and attorney fees. and
provided that after-acquired property should be the separate
property of the party acquiring it. In 1950 plaintiff petitioned the court for an increase in the -amount of the monthly
payments for the support of herself and the minor son. The
court awarded an additional $75 per month for the support
of the son but denied any increase for plaintiff's support on
the ground that the provision for monthly payments was an
inseparable part of the property settlement agreement. Plaintiff appealed and secured an order for costs and attorney fees
on appeal. and defendant appealed from the latter order.
If the provision for monthly payments pursuant to the
terms of the property settlement agreement had been entered
by the court in a divorce action. it is clear that it could not
be modified. [1] "A husband and wife may contract
with respect to their property (Civ. Code. § 158), and if they
are living separate and apart they may provide for the support and maintenance of either of them and their children.
(Civ. Code, § 159.) [2] Moreover, as between the husband
and wife, if the provisions for support and maintenance have
been made an integral or inseverable part of the division of
their property, and the court in a divorce action has approved
the qreement, its provisions cannot thereafter be modified
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without the consent of both of the partit's." (Dexter v. Dexter, ante, pp. 36, 40-41 [265 P.2d 873J ; st't' also Fox v. Fox,
ante, pp. 49, 52 [265 P.2d 881 J.) In this ease, as in the
Dexter and Fox cases. the parties made the provisions for
support and maintenance of plaintiff an integral part of their
property settlement agreemt'nt. They stated that they wished
to settle all of their "mutual rights and claims of every kind
and nature whatsoever," and provided that the "property
received by each of the parties hereto. respt'ctively, and the
agreements herein contained are received and made by each
of the parties hereto in full of all claims and rights of every
kind. nature and description . . . including any right or
relief with respect to property or maintenance . . . and . . .
in lieu of all rights which the law would give the other as
husband or wife." Accordingly, plaintiff may not be awarded
additional support and maintenance without changing the
property settlement agreement of the parties.
Plaintiff contends, however, in reliance on Monroe v.
Superior Oourl, 28 Ca1.2d 427 r170 P.2d 473], and Verdier
v. Verdier, 36 Ca1.2d 241 [223 P.2d 214], that while the
parties remain married the court has continuing jurisdiction
to modify the support and maintenance provisions of a
separate maintenance decree. and that the parties cannot. by
making the support provisions an integral part of a property
settlement, prevent the court from exercising its power of
modification. Neither of the cited cases supports this contention. In the Monroe case no property settlement agreement was involved, and it was held that the fact that support
payments under a separate maintenance decree had terminated
according to its terms did not prevent the court from modifying its decree to provide for additional. payments in the
future. In the Verdier case it was held that the existence of
an unperformed separation agreement did not prevent the
court from granting separate maintenance under section] 37 of
the Civil Code on the ground that the husband had wilfully
failed to support his wife. [3] In the present case. on the
other hand. the parties while living separate and apart entered
into a valid contract settling both their property and support
rights and secured its approval and adoption by the court.
Plaintiff has accepted the benefits of the agreement, and defendant has at all times performed his obli~ations thereunder.
The situation has not been l11terrcl b~' an nnacc('pted offrr of
reconciliation (see Oardinale v. Cardinale, 8 Ca1.2d 762,
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768 [68 P.2d 351]), or by a reconciliation (see Estate of
Boeson, 201 Cal. 36, 42-43 [255 P. 800] ; 1 Armstrong, California Family Law, pp. 582-584; see, also, Barham v. Barham.
33 Cal.2d 416. 427-429 [202 P.2d 289]), and neither of the
parties has given the other grounds for abrogating the a~ree
ment. (See Verdier v. Verdier, 36 Ca1.2d 241, 245-246 [223
P .2d 214].) Thus, neither of the parties has done anythin~
that would affect their status as spouses living separate and
apart under the terms of their contract as approved and incorporated in the judgment. (See London Gttar. &- Ace. Co.
v. Industrial Ace. Com., 181 Cal. 460. 466 [184 P. 864];
Sargent v. Sargent, 106 Cal. 541, 545-546 [39 P. 931].) Under
these circumstances there is no reasonable basis for holding
that their agreement is not binding upon them and the court.
Accordingly, the court cannot modify the payments or award
costs and attorney fees contrary to its terms.
The order denying modification of the judgment to increase
tlip support and maintenance payments to plaintiff is affirmerl.
The order awarding costs and attorney fees is reversed.
Each side shall hear its own costs on these appeals.
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Spence, J., and Bray, J. pro tem.,·
concurred.
CARTER, J.-I concur in the conclusion reached in the
majority opinion but my reasons for this conclusion are expressed in my dissents in Monroe v. Superior Court, 28 Cal.
2d 427, 432 [170 P.2d 473]; Verdier v. Verdier, 36 Ca1.2d
241, 249 [223 P.2d 214]; Dexter v. Dexter, ante, pp. 36.
44 [265 P.2d 873] ; Fox v. Fox, ante, pp. 49, 53 [265 P.2d
881] ; Flynn v. Flynn, ante. pp. 55. 62 r265 P.2d865J.
SCHAUER, J.-I concur in the judglllent and generally in
the holdings of the opinion. I expressly disavow, howevcr,
the implication, if any such be otherwise construable, that,
a valid contract having heen entered into. the validity or effect
or enforceability of that contract could be in anywise altered
by the unilateral act of either party.
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